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TREASURY REGULATIONS AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE IN THE POST-CHEVRON ERA
David A. Brennen
INTRODUCTION
1984 was a watershed year in administrative law
jurisprudence in the United States. That year, the Supreme
Court outlined the degree of deference courts must show to
agency regulatory interpretations of statutes.' The Court
concluded in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.2  that an administering agency's reasonable
regulatory interpretation of a statute must prevail over a
differing judicial interpretation in two instances: (1) when
Congress fails to unambiguously address the issue involved or (2)
when the agency's interpretation is consistent with Congress'
intentions.3 In so doing, the Court broke new ground in
administrative law by asserting that the judiciary must yield to
the reasonable legal and policy determinations of an executive
agency.4 Despite contrary assertions,' the Chevron directive
' Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, B.B.A_ Florida
Atlantic University; JD, LL.M., University of Florida College of Law. I would like to
thank my wife, Kimberly Dianna Brennen, for her support throughout this effort. I
would also like to thank Professor Michael K. Friel, Professor Martin L. Fried,
Professor Robin Paul Malloy, and Mr. Vaugh E. James for their thoughtful comments
and suggestions. Copyright 1997 David A. Brennen.
1. When this Article refers to an agency's "regulatory" interpretations, it is a
reference to the agency's interpretations set forth in the regulations promulgated by
that agency. Conversely, "nonregulatory" interpretations are agency interpretations
contained in agency pronouncements other than the agency's regulations.
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Id at 843.
4. Id at 865-66.
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government .... While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make...
policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.
Id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference To Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969 (1992).
5. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue
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remains unchanged today after more than a decade of subsequent
Supreme Court rulings.
Further, the Chevron directive is quite appropriate given the
form of governance in the United States. The role of courts is to
consistently interpret the laws passed by Congress.' The role of
agencies is to administer these laws to the extent permitted by
Congress.' This administrative role necessarily involves some
interpretation because Congress cannot be expected to anticipate
all the variant issues that may arise in a particular area of law.'
The Chevron directive outlines a workable method of allocating
interpretive responsibilities between courts and agencies, which
involves giving primary interpretive power to courts9 and
secondary interpretive power to agencies." However, the
agency's secondary power only exists when exercised in a proper
format authorized by Congress.
Without question, the federal tax code is the most technical
and complex of all federal statutory schemes." Given this level
of complexity, the Treasury Department, as the agency charged
with administering the tax laws,' must provide seemingly
Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 57-63 (1995).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); see also,
Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("[O]ne
of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes. .. ").
7. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965) ("The Commissioner's
rulings have only such force as Congress chooses to give them... .
8. See infra notes 147-62 and accompanying text.
9. The phrase "primary interpretive power" refers to the surviving role of courts
under Chevron to determine, in the first instance, what the language of a statute
means-with an eye toward establishing its ambiguity or lack thereof.
10. The phrase "secondary interpretive power" refers to the role of agencies under
Chevron to reasonably determine what Congress would have said in the statute if it
had been informed of the issue under consideration and unambiguously addressed it.
11. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943) (stating that the federal
tax law is "so complex as to be the despair of judges"); see also Coverdale, supra note
5, at 73; Tax Executive Institute, PRESmENTIAL CANDIDATES' TAX ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSALS RAISE POLICY CONCERNS, 72 TAX NOTES 1823 (Sept. 30, 1996) ("We know
from experience that the tax laws are mind-boggingly complex, and are convinced
that both the tax laws and their administration can be improved.").
12. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) provides:
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any
person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department,
the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal
revenue.
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endless guidance to the public on how to comply with these
laws. 3 Because they are often regarded as equivalent to
statutory law, valid Treasury regulations are the most important
form of Treasury guidance.'4  Treasury regulations-both
legislative and interpretive-are the most formal type of
Treasury guidance and are clothed with congressional delegatory
authority. 5 To the extent that these regulations are respected
by reviewing courts, the public is assured that compliance with
them is the same as complying with the related federal statute.
However, if reviewing courts refuse to defer to Treasury
regulatory interpretations of tax statutes, public confidence in
the Treasury is damaged, as is its ability to administer the tax
laws. Conceivably, this increases the likelihood that taxpayers
will challenge Treasury regulations in court.
Analysis of several post-Chevron cases indicates that every
major Supreme Court case since 1984 involving the validity of a
Treasury regulation is consistent with Chevron.6 Indeed, since
1984 every challenged Treasury regulation interpreting a statute
in which Congress failed to address a specific tax issue has been
upheld by the Court. 7 In fact, no Supreme Court case since
1984 could be discovered in which the Court invalidated a
Treasury regulation on the grounds that it was an unreasonable
interpretation of a statute." Several post-Chevron Supreme
Court decisions, however, rejected the Treasury's application of
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1994).
13. Among the many ways in which the Treasury fulfills this informing function is
by issuing Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, private letter rulings, technical
advice memoranda, and general counsel memoranda. The Treasury also provides
information on tax laws via informal oral advice and by making many of its internal
operating guidelines available to the public in the Internal Revenue Manual.
14. See infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text; see also Robert A. Anthony,
Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 4 (1990).
The threshold issue for the court is always one of congressional intent:
did Congress intend the agency's interpretation to bind the courts? The
touchstone in every case is whether Congress intended to delegate to the
agency the power to interpret with the force of law in the particular
format that was used.
Anthony, supra (emphasis omitted).
15. See Anthony, supra note 14, at 44-46.
16. See infra notes 172-254 and accompanying text.
17. See e.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
18. But see Rowan Cos. v. United States, a pre-Chevron case in which the Court
invalidated a Treasury regulation on the ground that it was inconsistent with
Congress' clearly expressed directive. 452 U.S. 247, 263 (1981).
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a tax regulation to a particular factual situation. 9 Additionally,
there have been times when the Court failed to defer to the
Treasury's non-regulatory interpretations." However, at least
with respect to Treasury regulatory interpretations, the Supreme
Court's review of tax cases since 1984 has been consistent with
Chevron.
Part I of this Article outlines the regulatory environment in
which the Treasury Department operates. It discusses the
authority of the Treasury to act as administrator of the tax laws,
as well as the several ways that the Treasury fulfills its
administrative obligation. Part II is an in-depth analysis of what
this Article terms the "Chevron era." It contains an overview of
several of the major Supreme Court cases preceding Chevron that
involved Treasury regulatory deference and an analysis of the
Chevron opinion. Part III focuses on the post-Chevron cases
involving Treasury regulatory deference. It shows how the
Supreme Court has abided by Chevron in each of its post-1984
decisions involving the validity of a Treasury regulation. Finally,
it concludes that, contrary to the assertions of others, Chevron
deference is alive and well. However, courts, especially the
Supreme Court, should be more consistent at referencing
Chevron so as to ensure continued adherence.
I. THE TREASURY'S AUTHORITY TO
IsSUE BINDING TAx REGULATIONS
A. Introduction
Professor Robert Anthony has argued that an agency's
interpretive authority should be viewed from two perspectives-
the agency's authority to interpret the subject area and its
authority to interpret in a particular format.2 This Article
focuses strictly on the Treasury's interpretations in the area of
tax law and on its interpretations issued in the form of Treasury
regulations. Thus, to the extent that the Treasury is authorized
to issue binding interpretations of tax statutes and is also
authorized to issue these binding interpretations in the form of
regulations, the only remaining inquiry for deference purposes is
whether the interpretation is reasonable."
19. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
20. See e.g., United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995).
21. See Anthony, supra note 14, at 31-40.
22. Of course, this conclusion assumes that Congress has failed to unambiguously
390
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B. Treasury Authority to Administer Tax Laws
Congress has clearly delegated to the Treasury authority to
interpret the revenue laws, including tax statutes. Indeed, by
statute, the Secretary of the Treasury has broad supervisory
authority over administration and enforcement of the tax laws.23
Further, § 7805(a) of Title 26 delegates to the Secretary of the
Treasury general rule-making authority to "prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the tax laws.24
Thus, any argument that the Treasury does not have authority to
issue binding interpretations in the field of tax is difficult-if not
impossible-to fathom.
C. Formats of the Treasury's Binding (and Non-Binding)
Interpretive Authority
The Treasury accomplishes its delegated responsibility of
comprehensive tax administration and enforcement in several
formats: oral advice, letter rulings, revenue rulings, and Treasury
regulations.25 Each of these formats is issued with differing
degrees of formality and levels of public notice. Accordingly, each
format carries a differing degree of congressional authority to
bind either courts or the public.26 A brief review of these various
address the specific matter to which the interpretation relates. If Congress has
addressed the precise matter, then the Treasury's interpretation probably lacks
delegated legislative authority and is necessarily invalid--even without deciding if it
is reasonable. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. Section 7801(a) provides: "(a) Powers and duties of Secretary. Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the administration and enforcement of this title
(title 261 shall be performed by or under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Treasury." 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a) (1994).
24. See supra note 12.
25. See generally Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 8.
26. See Anthony, supra note 14, at 46:
For these formats, as always, the delegation must be sought. Where none
is found or inferred, none should be presumed in any case unless, at a
minimum, the agency has expressed its interpretation with finality and
some formality, in a dispositive action-an action that specifies immediate
legal results or that definitively ordains results for the future. The
informal, or tentative, or advisory, or internal, or unpublicized
interpretive expression will not ordinarily be a tool that Congress intends
to implement its delegation of law-making authority. Additionally, an
interpretation put forth in such a format ordinarily will not have been
arrived at through a process that encompassed public or adversarial
participation.
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formats, however, reveals that Treasury regulations-both
legislative and interpretive-have the force and effect of law and
are necessarily binding.
1. Non-regulatory Formats
The Treasury's oral advice to taxpayers is the least formal of
its administrative tools.27 To obtain oral advice for preparation
of a federal individual income tax return a taxpayer can pick up
a telephone and dial 1-800-TAX-1040. Consistent with this lack
of formality, the Treasury's oral advice means next to nothing
when used as support for an argument of detrimental reliance
against the Treasury. Accordingly, the Treasury's oral advice
is entitled to no deference whatsoever, especially when the advice
is on the meaning of a statutory provision. Even with regard to
such mundane statutory matters as calculating when a document
should be filed in court,29 the Treasury's oral advice is ignored
not only by the courts, but also by the Treasury."
Increasing in formality, the next type of Treasury guidance is
letter rulings.3' A letter ruling is a written interpretation of the
tax laws issued by the Treasury via the Internal Revenue Service
27. See generally Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 13, 14.
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 6404(f) (1994) (indicating that only written (not oral) advice by
a Treasury officer or employee can form the basis for a claim that "any portion of
any penalty or addition to tax attributable to erroneous advice furnished to the
taxpayer" should be abated).
29. See, e.g., Elgart v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1996).
Turning to petitioners' argument that they were advised by several
employees of the IRS that the date by which a petition must be filed in
this case was March 14, 1996, we are unable to provide any relief for
petitioners. The law is clear that erroneous legal advice rendered by
employees of the IRS generally is not binding on the Commissioner. In
any event, the Commissioner cannot waive the jurisdictional
requirements, and jurisdiction cannot be established by estoppel.
Id (citations omitted); see also Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965). The Court
stated:
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, we held that the
Commissioner is empowered retroactively to correct mistakes of law in
the application of the tax laws to particular transactions. He may do so
even where a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment on the
Commissioner's mistake. This principle is no more than a reflection of
the fact that Congress, not the Commissioner, prescribes the tax laws.
Dixon, 381 U.S. at 72-73 (citations omitted).
30. See Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 14 (providing in part that "foiral guidance is
advisory only, and the Service is not bound to recognize it").
31. See id. at 12.
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to one or more specified taxpayers that applies the law to a
defined set of facts.32 Unlike oral advice, letter rulings are
conditionally binding upon the Treasury-at least with respect to
the taxpayer requesting and receiving the letter ruling."
Consequently, taxpayers routinely request letter rulings from the
Service prior to entering into financial or business transactions
that may result in tax liability.34 By having a letter ruling
outlining and approving a transaction ahead of time as either
tax-exempt or taxable only to a limited extent, the taxpayer at
least knows the Treasury's position on the matter.
Although a letter ruling may bind the Treasury with respect to
the described transaction, letter rulings cannot be relied upon by
third-party taxpayers or the Treasury as legal precedent.35
Nonetheless, both taxpayers and the Treasury routinely use
letter rulings to support legal arguments for or against taxation
in situations not described in, but similar to those described in,
the letter rulings. Thus, while letter rulings technically have no
precedential value, they are useful as a means of either
predicting what the Service will argue on an issue or showing
what position the Service has taken on an issue in the past. 6
Still, in no instance are reviewing courts required (as opposed to
permitted) to defer to the Treasury's interpretation of a statute
contained in one of its letter rulings.
Revenue rulings are the next most formal type of
nonregulatory guidance issued by the Treasury." Like letter
rulings, revenue rulings also contain the Service's interpretation
of the tax law as applied to the specific facts at issue."
However, revenue rulings are typically issued in relation to
issues of broad concern, and are always issued by the Treasury's
32. Id.
33. Id. Letter rulings are only conditionally binding upon the Service and the
taxpayer because they may be revoked or invalidated at any time prior to the
issuance of a closing agreement. Id. A closing agreement is an agreement between
the Service and a taxpayer on a specific issue or liability that is "final unless fraud,
malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact can be shown." Id.
34. Id. Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 96-1, § 5.01, letter rulings are generally issued in
income and gift tax matters on proposed transactions and on completed transactions
"if the letter ruling request is submitted before the return is filed for the year in
which the transaction that is the subject of the request was completed." Id. at 15.
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1994).
36. See, e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261-62 n.17 (1981).
37. See Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 13.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2) (1996).
393
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national office. 9 The Treasury treats revenue rulings published
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin as having precedential value.4"
However, unpublished revenue rulings carry no such weight.4'
Similarly, many courts ascribe precedential value to revenue
rulings where the situation in the ruling is substantially similar
to the situation involved in the court case. The Treasury warns
that taxpayers intending to rely on a revenue ruling "are
cautioned against reaching the same conclusion... unless thefir]
facts and circumstances are substantially the same."42 However,
because revenue rulings are interpretive only, they are not
subject to the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)4 Accordingly, while many
courts see revenue rulings as having precedential value, courts
generally do not ascribe any mandatory deference to the
Treasury's statutory interpretations contained in revenue
rulings. 44
39. See id.
40. See generally id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d)-(e).
(d) Revenue Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and
effect of Treasury Department Regulations (including Treasury decisions),
but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of
other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose. No
unpublished ruling or decision will be relied on, used, or cited, by any
officer or employee of the Service as a precedent in the disposition of
other cases.
(e) Taxpayers generally may rely upon Revenue Rulings published in
the Bulletin in determining the tax treatment of their own transactions
and need not request specific rulings applying the principles of a
published Revenue Ruling to the facts of their particular cases. However,
since each Revenue Ruling represents the conclusion of the Service as to
the application of the law to the entire state of facts involved, taxpayers,
Service personnel, and others concerned are cautioned against reaching
the same conclusion in other cases unless the facts and circumstances are
substantially the same. They should consider the effect of subsequent
legislation, regulations, court decisions, and revenue rulings.
41. See id.
42. Id. (emphasis supplied).
43. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
44. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 n.8 (1995) (quoting Davis
v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990) for the proposition that 'the Service's
interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations'"); see also Linda
Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56
OHIo ST. L.J. 1037 (1995) (arguing that federal courts have adopted divergent
standards when it comes to deciding how much deference to give to revenue rulings,
resulting in a significant split among the courts on the issue of revenue ruling
deference); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue
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2. Regulation Formats
Finally, Treasury regulations are the most formal and
important type of guidance issued by the Treasury.45 Like letter
rulings and revenue rulings, Treasury regulations contain
interpretations of tax laws. However, unlike letter rulings,
Treasury regulations are not issued to any one taxpayer; and,
unlike revenue rulings, Treasury regulations-both legislative
and interpretive-are issued pursuant to the APA's notice and
comment procedure.46 Once finalized, treasury regulations are
published in the Federal Register.4' Primarily because of this
highly formalized method of issuance, Treasury regulations are
accorded the highest level of deference of all Treasury
interpretations. The Supreme Court views valid Treasury
regulatory interpretations as the equivalent of the federal statute
being interpreted, unless such an interpretation is arbitrary or
capricious.' s
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REv. 841, 870-76 (1992) (arguing that the Court in Davis v.
United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990), endorsed a new heightened standard of judicial
deference for revenue rulings and spawned confusion in lower courts by not
discussing Chevron). But see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The
Unproven Case Of Increased Judicial Deference To Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
637, 639-40 (1996) (challenging Professor Galler's conclusions in her second
article-Judicial Deference To Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards-as
based on a "hyperopic" and a "myopic" view of tax law); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia,
Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV.
517, 557-63 (1994) [hereinafter Mamas Don't Let] (challenging Professor Galler's
conclusions in her first article-Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS
Revenue Rulings-as based on a misunderstanding of both tax and nontax principles);
see also Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: What It's All About, 72
TAX NOTES 769, 770 (Aug. 5, 1996) (responding to Professor Caron's criticisms as
resulting from "fundamental misunderstandings" and "inisinterpret[ations]" of Galler's
work).
45. See generally Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(1) (1996).
46. Although only legislative regulations are required to be issued pursuant to the
APA's notice and comment procedure, the Treasury issues all of its
regulations-legislative and interpretative-pursuant to these guidelines. See Ellen
Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FL. TAX REV. 51, 57
(1996).
47. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d) (1996).
48. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) ("The regulation at
issue in this case is therefore entitled to more than mere deference or weight. It can
be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation
is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law' ").
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II. THE CHEVRON ERA
A. Introduction to the Chevron Era
In the fourteen years prior to the Chevron decision in 1984, the
Supreme Court issued several decisions that passed on the
validity or invalidity of Treasury regulations.49 Each of these
pre-Chevron tax cases was decided in a legal environment that
was devoid of a comprehensive deference methodology. At that
time, the Court had no uniform procedure for evaluating whether
its own determination, or that of an administering agency, should
control when deciding how to interpret a federal tax statute.0
Instead, the Court used a hodge-podge of factors to determine
how much weight the judiciary should give agency
interpretations. These factors included the expertise of the
agency, the technical complexity of the subject matter, the
consistency of the agency in expressing its view and the amount
of time between enactment of the statute and issuance of the rule
or regulation.5 However, prior to Chevron, the Court did not
mandate that the judiciary must defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute.52
The Chevron decision changed this approach to deference by
ushering in an element of certainty, at least in terms of
methodology, into an otherwise uncertain area. With the Chevron
decision, less attention is given to the "weight" of factors and
more attention is given to how and when the factors are
weighed.53 Thus, without regard to how a court would have
decided a pre-Chevron case, that decisional process is necessarily
changed to the extent that Chevron mandates a court to defer to
49. See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); United States v.
Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247
(1981); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); National Muffler
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Thor Power Tool Co. v.
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979); Central l. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 21 (1978); Fulman v. U.S., 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Commissioner v. Standard Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
50. See Anthony, supra note 14, at 6 ("No pre-Chevron case articulated a consistent
or comprehensive statement of doctrine, like that ventured in Chevron, on the
appropriate measure of judicial deference to agencies.").
51. See, e.g., National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477; see Coverdale, supra note 5, at 42.
52. See Anthony, supra note 14, at 6 ("But the pre-Chevron cases were habitually
unclear in indicating the point at which the weight or deference due would compel a
court to accept the agency interpretation.").
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
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the agency. Simultaneously, however, the Chevron decision left
much of the substance of pre-Chevron administrative
jurisprudence intact.54 This point is reflected in Chevron's




Reviewing the pre-Chevron tax decisions provides some insight
into the Court's focus when deciding a deference issue prior to
1984. This judicial focus reveals that pre-Chevron Treasury
regulations interpreting terms not already defined by statute
were likely to be upheld by the Supreme Court as valid."
Conversely, Treasury regulations interpreting terms already
defined by Congress-either in the statute or through legislative
history-were less likely to survive Supreme Court scrutiny."
Thus, the absence or presence of a congressional definition of a
term that the Treasury interpreted and defined by regulation
was often critical to deciding if the regulation was valid."
1. Challenged Regulation Upheld: Congress Did Not Define the
Term by Statute
The defining case of the pre-Chevron era in which the Supreme
Court outlined appropriate standards for judicial review of
Treasury regulations is National Muffler Dealers Assoc'n v.
United States.59 From National Muffler, it is quite evident that,
before Chevron, a Treasury regulatory interpretation of a statute
was upheld as valid whenever the Court determined that the
Treasury's interpretation was not inconsistent with Congress'
expressed intentions.
National Muffler involved the validity of Treasury Regulation
section 1.501(c)(6)-1, ° which defined the term "business league"
54. E.g., Anthony, supra note 14, at 15 ("This broad structure [of the pre-Chevron
cases] continues after Chevron.").
55. But see infra notes 158-60 (discussing the theory that the Court, with Chevron,
failed to continue the practice of distinguishing legislative and interpretive
regulations).
56. See infra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
58. But c.f. Anthony, supra note 14, at 14-15.
59. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
60. Id. at 474. Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1 provides:
397
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as used in section 501(c)(6) of the Code.6 The taxpayer, a
franchisee association of Midas Muffler, sued the Commissioner
for refund of federal income taxes, alleging that the
Commissioner improperly denied the association tax-exempt
"business league" status. 2
The Supreme Court concluded that Treasury Regulation
section 1.501(c)(6)-1 was valid.63 The Court reasoned that,
because "business league" had "no well-defined meaning or
common usage" outside of tax law, the term most appropriately
lent itself to a Treasury regulatory interpretation." Under such
circumstances, "'if [the regulation was] found to "implement the
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,"'" it was
upheld.65 One purpose of the congressional mandate supporting
the "business league" exemption was to exempt organizations
primarily purposed to promote general business welfare.66 Thus,
the Treasury's conclusion that section 501(c)(6) "business
leagues" should work towards "improvement of business
A business league is an association of persons having some common
business interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common
interest and not to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily
carried on for profit. It is an organization of the same general class as a
chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activities should be
directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines
of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services
for individual persons .... A stock or commodity exchange is not a
business league, a chamber of commerce, or a board of trade within the
meaning of section 501(c)(6) and is not exempt from tax.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1996).
61. Section 501(c)(6) exempts the following from the federal income tax: "[b]usiness
leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional
football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players),
not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994).
62. National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 473-75. The district court denied the association's
refund request, concluding that the Midas franchisees did not constitute a "line of
business" under Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-l. Id. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that Congress provided no contrary guidance in the statute. The
appellate court reasoned that the Treasury's "line of business" requirement was
consistent with the congressional intention that the exemption apply to
'organizations which promote some aspect of the general economic welfare rather
than support particular private interests.' " Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, imposing a "line of business" requirement was the Treasury's means of
ensuring promotion of some aspect of the general economic welfare. Id.
63. Id at 489.
64. Id. at 476.
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 480-82.
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conditions or to the promotion of the general objects of one or
more lines of business" was consistent with congressional
intention. 7
Noticeably absent from the National Muffler decision is any
discussion of a requirement that the Court abide by the
Treasury's decision in its regulatory interpretation of section
501(c)(6). Indeed, the Court "deferred" to the agency because it
was appropriate given the circumstances, namely, an absence of
a congressional definition of "business league" and the
consistency of the Treasury's interpretation with the general
purposes of the statute." This substantive element of judicial
deference to agency interpretations still exists today."
Another pre-Chevron case in which the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the Treasury's regulatory interpretation of a
statute is Fulman v. United States." In Fulman, a taxpayer71
unsuccessfully challenged the Treasury's regulatory
interpretation of a dividend valuation statute."2 The issue was
whether the Treasury's regulatory determination regarding
valuation of appreciated property distributed as a deficiency
dividend by a personal holding company73 was valid. 4 The
67. Id. at 482 (quoting Treas. Regs. 74, art. 528 (1929)).
68. Id. at 481-84.
69. See infra notes 173-255 and accompanying text.
70. 434 U.S. 528 (1978).
71. Id The taxpayer was actually the successor corporation to a personal holding
company. However, for ease of reference, "taxpayer" is used to refer to both the'
successor and the predecessor companies. Id. at 531-32.
72. Id. at 529.
73. Id. A § 542 personal holding company was described generally as any
corporation having at least 60% of its adjusted ordinary gross income consisting of
personal holding company income and 50% of whose stock value was owned by five
or fewer individuals during the last half of the year. Id. at 531 n.5. Per § 542(c),
corporations such as banks, life insurance companies, surety companies, certain
lending or finance companies, § 501 tax-exempt organizations, and others are
categorically excluded from the personal holding company definition. 26 U.S.C.
§ 542(c) (1994). Pursuant to § 543, personal holding company income generally
consisted of dividends, rents and royalties. Fulman, 434 U.S. at 531 n.5.
74. Fulman, 434 U.S. at 529. The Commissioner first assessed a § 541 personal
holding company tax against the taxpayer, which (pursuant to § 541) was equal to
39.6% of undistributed personal holding company income. Id. at 531-32. Then,
pursuant to § 547, the Commissioner permitted the taxpayer to make "deficiency
dividend" payments to its shareholders to reduce or eliminate the amount of personal
holding company tax owed. Id at 532. Accordingly, the taxpayer distributed shares of
stock held in other companies to its shareholders as deficiency dividends. Id.
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taxpayer claimed a deficiency dividend deduction for the fair
market value of shares distributed to its shareholders.75
Pursuant to section 562 of Title 26 and Treasury Regulation
section 1.562-1(a), the Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's
claimed deduction to the extent that it exceeded the adjusted
basis of the stock distributed." Section 562 provided that
"dividends" eligible for the dividends paid deduction include
"'only dividends described in § 316.' ,77 Treasury regulation
section 1.562-1(a) provided that dividends paid in property other
than money were valued at "'the adjusted basis of the property
in the hands of the distributing corporation at the time of the
distribution.' "78 Thus, the taxpayers attempt to value the stock
dividend at fair market value clearly conflicted with the
Treasury's regulatory interpretation of section 562's definition
of "dividends" eligible for deduction.7"
The Supreme Court concluded that the Treasury's regulatory
interpretation of section 562 was reasonable 0 The Court noted
that C.;ngress failed to address the valuation issue under then-
current law. 1 Thus, while the pre-1954 personal holding
company statute clearly indicated that "adjusted basis" was the
proper corporate valuation method, 2 Congress expressed no
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 529 n.1 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 562 (1954)). Section 561(b) provides that,
"[]n determining the deduction for dividends paid, the rules provided in section 562
(relating to rules applicable in determining dividends eligible for dividends paid
deduction) . . .shall be applicable." Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 561 (1954)).
78. Id. at 529 n.1 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1 (1977)).
79. Id. at 529-30. After paying the additional personal holding company tax
assessed because of the reduction of the deduction, the taxpayer filed a claim for
refund. Id. at 532. The Commissioner denied the taxpayer's refund request. The
taxpayer then sought judicial review of the Commissioner's refund denial in federal
district court, but both the federal district court and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the Commissioner's refund denial and the validity of the
Treasury's regulatory interpretation of § 562. Id.
80. Id. at 538-39.
81. Id. at 538.
82. See id at 536-37. The Court writes:
In the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress enacted a surtax on undistributed
profits intended to supplement the 1934 enactment of the personal
holding company tax. In § 27(c) of the 1936 Act, 49 Stat. 1665, later
codified as § 27(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 20,
Congress expressly provided the "adjusted basis" measure for valuation
with respect to the distributing corporation of dividends paid in
appreciated property rather than money:
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opinion in the post-1954 statute as to how to value these
dividends. s3  Therefore, the Treasury's interpretation of
Congress' ambiguous legislative silence was appropriate and
reasonable and evidenced no "'weighty reasons' that would
justify setting aside the [regulation].""
Notably, the Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's claim that
its own statutory interpretation, and that of another court,
should be followed because it was more reasonable than the
If a dividend is paid in property other than money ... the
dividends paid credit with respect thereto shall be the adjusted
basis of the property in the hands of the corporation at the time of
the payment, or the fair market value of the property at the time
of the payment, whichever is the lower.
Although this section may not have been enacted with the personal
holding company tax primarily in mind, § 351(b)(2)(C) of the 1936 Act
nonetheless expressly provided that the dividends-paid credit for that tax
would be governed by § 27(c). At the same time, in contrast, the 1936
Act provided that property distributed as a dividend would be valued
with respect to distributees at its fair market value.
Id. at 536-37 (citation omitted).
83. See id. at 537-38. The Court further stated:
Nor can Congress' failure to re-enact a counterpart to § 27(c) in the
1954 Code be read unambiguously to indicate that Congress had
abandoned the "adjusted basis" measure in favor of the "fair market
value" measure. In describing the purpose of § 562(a), which defines
dividends eligible for deduction for personal holding company tax
purposes, the Senate Finance Committee explained:
Subsection (a) provides that the term 'dividend' for purposes of this
part shall include, except as otherwise provided in this section,
only those dividends described in section 316 .... The
requirements of sections 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) of existing law
[Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended] are contained in the
definition of 'dividend' in section 312, and accordingly are not
restated in section 562.
The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee is in haec verba,
except that it says that the requirements of §§ 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) are
contained in what is now § 316 of the 1954 Code. The discrepancy
between the House and Senate Reports is not material, however, since,
as we have explained, there is no way to reach the result of § 27(c) by
following any path through the language of the 1954 Code. In light of
the failure of the language of the Code to create the result of § 27(c),
the statement in the House and Senate Reports could be read to indicate
that Congress meant to incorporate only so much of § 27 as was actually
enacted-that is, none of it. But this meaning is not compelled, and we
cannot say that the language of the Reports cannot be read to evince
Congress' intention, albeit erroneously abandoned in execution, to retain
the "adjusted basis" valuation rule of § 27(c).
Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 539.
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Treasury's.85 The taxpayer argued that personal holding
company dividends should be valued in the same manner for
both the distributing corporation and the distributee
shareholder. 6  While acknowledging the logic and
reasonableness of the taxpayer's argument, the Court noted that
the Treasury's reasonable regulatory interpretation should
prevail-even in the face of the taxpayer's equally reasonable
alternative interpretation.87 Thus, even in the pre-Chevron era,
the Court recognized the strength of the Treasury's reasonable
regulatory interpretations, especially where Congress has failed
to provide statutory guidance.
2. Challenged Regulation Invalidated. Congress Defined the
Term in the Statute
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,88 is one of the few pre-
Chevron cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated the
Treasury's regulatory interpretation of a federal statute.89
Vogel involved the Treasury's regulatory interpretation of the
term "brother-sister controlled group," as used in § 1563(a)(2) of
Title 26." According to the Code provision, a "brother-sister
controlled group" consisted of:
Two or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons... own...
stock possessing--(A) at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power ... or at least 80 percent of the total
value... of each corporation, and (B) more than 50 percent
of the total combined voting power ... or more than 50
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of
each corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of
85. See id& at 532.
86. See id. at 534-36.
87. Id.; see also National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488
(1979). (The choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the
courts.")
88. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 18-19. In Vogel, the taxpayer was a corporation whose major individual
shareholder owned more than three-fourths of all its outstanding common shares. Id.
at 19-20. The remaining shares were owned by one other individual. The taxpayer's
major shareholder also owned about 90% of the stock of another corporation, Vogel
Popcorn Co. The taxpayer's minority stockholder owned no shares of Vogel Popcorn.
Id. at 19-21.
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each such person only to the extent such stock ownership is
identical with respect to each such corporation.91
The Treasury further interpreted the term "brother-sister
controlled group" in regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) to require
that the same five or fewer persons "'own... singly or in
combination' "the prescribed percentages of voting power or total
value. 2 Thus, the deference issue was whether the Treasury's
regulatory interpretation-that the prescribed percentages be
owned either singly or in combination-was valid. 3
The taxpayer argued that part A included a "common-
ownership requirement" because of Congress' intent in section
1563 to "identify[ I interrelated corporations that are...
subdivided portions of a larger entity."94  Contrarily, the
Commissioner argued that under its regulation the 50%
requirement sufficiently measured the interrelationship between
two corporations. Accordingly, per the Commissioner, the 80%
requirement was independently significant. 6 It insured that the
corporate group members were closely held, so that, when
necessary, the majority shareholders could obtain additional
control without "'dealing with a large number of other
shareholders.' ""
The Supreme Court accepted the taxpayer's argument that
Congress intended a "common-ownership" requirement for part A
of the "brother-sister" definition.98 In. reviewing both the statute
and its legislative history, the Court used traditional legislative
construction techniques. First, the Court noted that the language
of the statute "harmonized" more with the taxpayer's view than
91. Id. at 18 n.2 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1994)).
92. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), 26 C.F.R. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)
(1981)). Pursuant to § 1561(a), a "controlled group of corporations", as determined by
who owns and controls shares in the corporations, was limited to one corporate
surtax exemption. Id. at 18. Thus, if the ownership of both the taxpayer and Vogel
Popcorn were such that they were members of a controlled group, the combined
corporations would be entitled to just one such exemption. However, in order to be
entitled to this benefit, the corporations, according to § 1563(a)(2), had to be a
"brother-sister controlled group" of corporations. Id.
93. Id. at 19. Because the taxpayer's majority shareholder satisfied part B of the
1563(a)(2) test by owning more than 50 percent of both corporations, the real issue
was whether his ownership satisfied part A (the 80% requirement). Id. at 21-22.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 25.
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with the Treasury's regulation.99 Indeed, according to the
Court, the term "brother-sister controlled group," connotes a
"close horizontal relationship between two" corporations that is
reflected more in a common-ownership arrangement.' ° Second,
the structure of the statute-first defining the controlling group
of shareholders as five or fewer and then setting forth the
ownership requirements-suggests common-ownership.1°
Finally, there was no language in part A of the statute requiring
that the 80% ownership be "'singly or in combination' " as
indicated in the regulation. 2
Even assuming that the statute was somehow ambiguous, the
Court concluded that a review of the legislative history quickly
cleared up any ambiguity.0 3  According to the committee
reports,' the purpose of the controlled-group test was to target
interrelated corporations by curbing abusive multiple
incorporations through which large corporations subdivide into
smaller ones to receive special tax benefits.' Accordingly, a
1964 definition of "brother-sister controlled group" clearly
included a common-ownership requirement because the same
person had to own 80% of all corporations in the group.0 6 Even
more telling in the legislative history were the Treasury's 1969
tax reform proposals in which the Treasury stressed that the
same five or fewer persons owning at least 80% of the voting
stock of each corporation must also satisfy the 50%




102. Id. at 26.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27. The Court then cited the House Ways and Means Committee Report,
which provides:
Large organizations have been able to obtain substantial benefits . . .by
dividing the organization's income among a number of related
corporations. Your committee does not believe that large organizations
which operate through multiple corporations should be allowed to receive
the substantial and unintended tax benefits resulting from the multiple
use of the surtax exemption and the other provisions of present law.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 98, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.CA.N. 1746-1747).
105. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 26-27.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Id. at 29.
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incompatible with the Treasury's singly or in combination
regulatory interpretation.'
The Court's invalidation of the regulation in Vogel does not
run counter to what one would have expected under pre-Chevron
analysis. Indeed, the deference issue in Vogel concerned
interpretation of a term that Congress, while not addressed in
the language of the statute, clearly contemplated when they
drafted it. In fact, the Treasury, as an institution, fought for, and
advanced the interpretation that was antithetical to the one
espoused in its regulation.0 9  In the presence of such
overwhelming evidence of congressional intention, the Court had
very little choice other than to invalidate the Treasury's rule.
Another pre-Chevron case in which the Supreme Court did not
defer to the Treasury's regulatory interpretation of a statutory
term is Rowan Cos., Inc., v. United States."°  Rowan".
involved the Treasury's regulatory interpretation of the term
"wages" for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA)"' and the Federal Unemployment Taxation Act
(FUTA)."' The deference issue was whether the Treasury's
differing regulatory interpretations of the term "wages" for
FICA/FUTA purposes and for federal income tax purposes were
valid."
108. Id. at 30.
109. Id.
110. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
111. In Rowan, the taxpayer-employer owned and operated oil and gas drilling rigs.
Id. at 248. Because the rigs were often located several miles from land, it cost the
taxpayer significantly less money to provide its employees with meals and lodging
near the rig each day of work than to transport the employees back and forth
between the rig and land each day. Id. The taxpayer did not include the value of the
meals and lodging in its computation of employee wages for purposes of paying FICA
and FUTA taxes, nor for the purpose of withholding federal income taxes. Id.
112. Id (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3127 (1989)). FICA imposes on the employer an
u'excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to [specified]
percentages of the wages ... paid by him with respect to employment.' " Id. at n.2
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3111 (1970)). The purpose of FICA taxes is to fund social
security.
113. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 248 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3127 (1989)). FUTA imposes
upon the employer an " 'excise tax, with respect to having individuals in [their]
employ, equal to [specified percentages] of the total wages . . . paid by [them] during
the calendar year with respect to employment.' " Id. at n.2 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3301
(1970)). The purpose of FUTA taxes is to fund unemployment.
114. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 250. Specifically, the issue was whether "wages" included
the value of meals and lodging provided by an employer, for the employer's
convenience, to its employees. Id at 248.
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By statute, Congress defined "wages" for FICA and FUTA
purposes as including "all remuneration for employment,
including the cash value of all remuneration... paid in any
medium other than cash.""5 For federal income tax withholding
purposes, "wages" means "all remuneration (other than fees paid
to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his
employer, including the cash value of all remuneration.., paid
in any medium other than cash.""6 Pursuant to its regulations,
the Treasury interpreted the FICA and FUTA "wages" definition
to include the meals and lodging provided by the taxpayer-
employer to its employees." 7  Conversely, the Treasury
interpreted the federal income tax withholding definition of
"wages"15 as not including the employer-provided meals and
lodging."
The Supreme Court held that the inconsistent regulatory
interpretations of "wages" contradicted both the historical
language of the statutes and their legislative histories. 2 '
Indeed, since original enactment of the FICA and FUTA taxes
and the federal withholding tax, Congress had used nearly
identical definitions of the term "wages" as the base for each
115. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1994) (FICA); id. § 3306(b) (FUTA).
116. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 249 n.4 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a)).
117. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 250-51. Pursuant to § 31.3121(a)-I(f)(FICA) and
§ 31.3306(b)-1(f) (FUTA):
[Flacilities or privileges . . . furnished or offered by an employer to his
employees generally, are not considered as remuneration for employment
if such facilities or privileges are of relatively small value and are offered
or furnished by the employer merely as a means of promoting the health,
good will, contentment, or efficiency of his employees. The term 'facilities
or privileges,' however, does not ordinarily include the value of meals or
lodging furnished, for example, to restaurant or hotel employees, or to
seamen or other employees aboard vessels, since generally these items
constitute an appreciable part of the total remuneration of such
employees.
Id. at 252 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-1(f), 26 C.F.R. § 31.312(a)-l(f) (1980);
Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(b)-l(f), 26 C.F.R. § 31-3306(b)-l(f) (1980)).
118. Id. at 251. Pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)-1(b)(9), the employer excludes
the value of meals and lodging from "wages" to the extent the employee excludes the
value from gross income. Id.
119. Id. at 250-51. After paying the additional assessment associated with inclusion
of the value of the meals and lodging as "wages", the taxpayer sued for a refund in
federal district court. Id. at 250. The district court granted summary judgment to the
Service. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, justifying its decision by
focusing on the purposes of FICA and FUTA as contrasted to the purpose of federal
income tax withholding. Id.
120. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 255.
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tax."2 Additionally, legislative history indicated that Congress
was concerned with "'the interest of simplicity and ease of
administration'" when enacting the federal withholding tax. 2
Thus, Congress' decision to define "wages" for withholding tax
purposes consistent with the then-existing definition of "wages"
for FICA and FUTA purposes was consistent with the legislative
history." Accordingly, the Court invalidated the Treasury's
regulatory attempt to create different definitions for FICA, FUTA
and federal withholding purposes.' 4
C. The Chevron Decision
The most complete analysis of the Supreme Court's modern
principle of deference to an agency's regulatory interpretation of
a statute is contained in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.' The ultimate issue in
Chevron was whether an agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), or a federal court should have the final say as to
the meaning of a term in a federal statute when Congress has
failed to define the term." After criticizing the lower court for
refusing to accept EPA's determination as to what the statutory
term "stationary source" meant, the Supreme Court concluded
that the agency's view of the term must be respected. 7
1. The Rule Challenge Proceeding
The Chevron case resulted from judicial review of an EPA rule-
challenge proceeding as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).'
Section 7607(b)(1) permits a person to seek judicial review of
pollution-related regulations promulgated by EPA. The petition
for review must be filed in a timely fashion-usually within sixty
days of publication." Providing for judicial review of an
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 257.
124. Id. at 263.
125. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
126. Id. at 839-42.
127. Id. at 866.
128. Id at 841.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) provides, in part:
(b) Judicial review.
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in
promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air
407
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agency's rules and regulations is typical in administrative law
parlance-both at the federal3 ° and state level.'3'
2. The Federal Statute Interpreted by EPA
The Federal law at issue in Chevron, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6),
concerned standards for eliminating air pollution.'32
Specifically, Congress imposed a permit requirement for" 'new or
modified major stationary sources'" of air pollution located in
states that had not achieved previous air quality standards
established by the EPA. 3 Thus, before one could construct or
operate a new or modified stationary source in a "nonattainment
state," Congress required that a permit be issued by the state
under an EPA-approved permit program.
quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under
section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or
requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under
section 7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be
prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of this title, any determination
under section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition
under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of
this title any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or under
section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the
Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia .... Any
petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty
days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action
appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is
based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any
petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty
days after such grounds arise.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994).
130. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1996) ("A "person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
131. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68 (1995) ("A party who is adversely affected
by final agency action is entitled to judicial review.").
132. Chevron,U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 839-
40 (1984). The court cited § 7502(b)(6), which then provided: "[t]he plan provisions
required by subsection (a) shall... require permits for the construction and
operation of new or modified major stationary sources in accordance with section 173
(relating to permit requirements)." Id. at 840 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)).
133. Id. at 840.
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3. The Challenged EPA Regulations
The EPA regulations challenged in Chevron interpreted the
term "stationary source" as used in the permit program statute,
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6). The regulations provided that:
(i) 'Stationary source' means any building, structure, facility,
or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant
subject to regulation under the Act. (ii) 'Building, structure,
facility, or installation' means all the pollution-emitting
activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are
located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and
are under the control of the same person (or persons under
common control) except the activities of any vessel."'
The EPA issued this interpretive regulation pursuant to its
congressionally granted general rule-making authority.13
Pursuant to the EPA's regulation, pollutants could be
measured as emitted from a controlled group of polluters located
in the same general area. 3 ' In essence, one industrial grouping
of polluters-regardless of the number of separate smoke stacks
operated by the group-was treated as one single plant for EPA
regulatory purposes. The EPA regulation permitted what has
been called a plant-wide definition of the term "stationary
source"--allowing the entire plant to be treated as contained
within a single bubble.'37 Accordingly, increased emissions from
a new or modified emitting device could be netted against
reduced emissions from another device located within the same
commonly controlled grouping of devices.'
4. The Court of Appeals' Decision
After appropriate review, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit set aside the EPA regulations as contrary to
law.3 9 The Circuit Court observed that the relevant portions of
134. Id. at 840 n.2 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1983)).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (1994); Coverdale, supra note 5, at 49-50. But see
Aprill, supra note 45, at 63 (referring to the Chevron regulation as legislative). For
purposes of this Article, the labeling of the Chevron regulation as legislative or
interpretive has no practical effect. Indeed, even as interpretive, the Chevron
regulation went through notice and comment. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50766-71 (1981).
136. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 841.
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the implemented federal statue do not define what Congress
meant by the term "stationary source" with regard to the permit
program.' Further, that court noted that Congress failed to
address this precise issue in the legislative history.' Thus,
faced with no guidance from Congress, the Circuit Court
reasoned that the court-determined purposes of the permit
program should direct it to the right conclusion.'
The District of Columbia Circuit Court determined that
permitting bubbling in nonattainment states could maintain air
quality but would not improve it.' Therefore, the court-
determined purpose of the permit program was to improve air
quality. The court invalidated the EPA regulation allowing
bubbling as inconsistent with this unstated Congressional
mandate.'
5. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit
because it failed to respect the EPA's status as the agency
charged with implementing and administering environmental
laws.' The high court noted that the Circuit Court erred when
it chose to adopt a static, unyielding definition of the term
"stationary source" after it decided that Congress failed to define
the term.'46 Instead, the circuit court should have deferred to
the EPA's expertise in environmental matters and upheld the
more flexible definition of "stationary source" contained in the
challenged regulation.
a. The Chevron Two-Step
The standard applied by the Supreme Court when reversing
the Circuit Court has been affectionately referred to as the




143. Id. at 841-42.
144. Id. at 842.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J.
ON REG. 283, 287-88 (1986) referring to the following language from Chevron:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
410
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an agency's regulatory interpretation of a statute administered
by the agency ask whether Congress has spoken to the precise
question at issue.' If Congress has already addressed the
issue, then both the court and the agency must yield to
Congressional intent.'49  If Congress has failed to clearly
address the issue-either in the statute or in the legislative
history-the court must then move to step two and ask whether
the agency's interpretation is "permissible" under the
statute. 5 ' If it is, the agency's rule should be upheld; if not,
the reviewing court must invalidate the agency's rule. '5
b. The Two-Step Rationale
The Supreme Court's rationale for this two-step approach
emanates from the role of agencies as statutory gap-fillers. 5 '
When an agency is empowered by Congress to administer a
congressional program, the agency necessarily has the power to
formulate policy and issue rules to fill any statutory gaps left by
Congress.'53 Thus, when Congress states that an agency shall
promulgate rules to implement a particular statute, the agency is
said to have an explicit delegation from Congress to issue
regulatory guidance."M Accordingly, such legislative regulations
should be upheld unless arbitrary or capricious.' Additionally,
when Congress states that an agency is charged with enforcing a
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
148. Id. at 842.
149. Id. at 842-43.
150. Id. at 843. Permissibility necessarily entails notions of delegated authority.
Hence, permissibility under Chevron is premised on the agency interpretation being
within the agency's area of expertise and in a binding format. See supra notes 21-48
and accompanying text.
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
152. See id
153. Id. at 843.
154. Id. at 843-44.
155. Id.
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group of statutes, the agency has an implicit congressional
delegation to issue all necessary interpretive rules." 6 Notably,
if the agency doing the interpretation does not have
"administrative" authority with respect to the interpreted
statute, Chevron deference is not required.
5 7
Professor John Coverdale argued that this gap-filler rationale
supports a finding that Chevron deference applies to Treasury
legislative regulations, but does not support a finding that it
applies to Treasury interpretive regulations. 5 His argument is
based on the historical notion that legislative and interpretive
regulations are distinguishable such that legislative regulations
deserve more "weight" than interpretive regulations. 9 The
argument is as follows:
156. Chevron suggests that either silence or ambiguity is sufficient ground upon
which to base a claim of implicit delegation to an agency, assuming of course that
the agency has broad policy-making authority in the substantive area:
Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself
on the level of specificity presented by [this case]. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility
for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so;
perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question,
and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme
devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of
these things occurred.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
157. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
158. Coverdale, supra note 5, at 67-70.
159. Id. The article states the following:
Both courts and commentators have long held that general authority
regulations are merely interpretive and that, therefore, courts should
review them more searchingly than legislative regulations issued under a
grant of specific authority. As early as 1940, Stanley S. Surrey, the most
influential tax theorist of his generation, noted that the general
delegation of authority to the Treasury is not sufficient to delegate
legislative authority. Twenty-five years later, the then Chief Counsel of
the Internal Revenue Service, Mitchell Rogovin, highlighted the
distinction between legislative regulations promulgated under a specific
grant of authority and interpretive regulations promulgated under the
more general grant of authority to the secretary. This distinction was
embraced by the Supreme Court in Rowan and Vogel Fertilizer. It has
since become an obligatory reference in court opinions reviewing Treasury
regulations. Such opinions regularly treat the step of determining
whether a regulation was issued under section 7805(a), the general grant
of authority or under a specific grant of authority as an indispensable
"preliminary task."
Id. at 68-69 (citations omitted).
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When Congress grants... [legislative] regulatory authority,
it should be understood to be saying that the statute is
incomplete and that it intends the Commissioner to elaborate
a policy. Conversely, when Congress does not grant...
[legislative] authority, it should be understood to view the
statute as complete, requiring only interpretation and
application, subject to court review. To construe congressional
silence or mere ambiguity of the tax statutes as equivalent to
a... [legislative] delegation of regulatory authority ignores
the established background norm against which Congress has
enacted tax legislation, renders meaningless the specific
delegations Congress has enacted in the Internal Revenue
Code, and thereby flies in the face of the maxim that courts
should strive to give effect to every provision in a statute.16
This Article disagrees with Professor Coverdale's argument
for two reasons. First, the facts of Chevron indicate that its two-
step analysis applies to all agency regulations. Nowhere in the
opinion does the Court, in light of its obvious knowledge of the
history of differentiating legislative and interpretive regulations,
indicate that Chevron's applicability is somehow limited to one
of the two types of regulations. Indeed, if Chevron were so
limited, it would probably be limited to interpretive, not
legislative, regulations since Chevron involved an EPA
interpretive regulation. 6' With respect to this latter point,
Professor Coverdale points out that "courts reviewing
environmental regulations [unlike with tax regulations] rarely
stress the distinction between [legislative and interpretive
regulations]."'62  However, because we have only one
Congress-not an environmental Congress and a separate tax
Congress-the significance of this distinction is unclear. 3
160. Id. at 69-70.
161. See Coverdale, supra note 5, at 49-50.
162. Id. at 70.
163. This is not to say that Professor Coverdale's view is a result of "tax myopia."
See, e.g., Caron, Mamas Don't Let, supra note 44, at 518 (arguing "that tax law too
often is mistakenly viewed by lawyers, judges, and law professors as a self-contained
body of law"). Instead, the significance of the distinction between tax regulations and
environmental regulations may lie in the fact all tax regulations-legislative and
interpretive-are subjected to the same stringent formalities. Thus, because all tax
regulations are subject to public comment and are published in the Federal Register,
they are intended to be binding on both the Treasury and the courts. See supra notes
21-48 and accompanying text. But this analysis should lead one to conclude that the
distinction between environmental and tax regulations indicates that all tax
regulations-legislative and interpretative-should be subject to the same deference
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Second, on a more fundamental level, congressional silence or
ambiguity is subject to more interpretations than the one
concluding that Congress has not delegated authority to the
agency to act. For instance, congressional silence may mean that
Congress, as a legislative body, simply did not contemplate the
precise issue being considered. Silence may also mean that
Congress considered the issue, but members of Congress could
not agree collectively on how to address the issue by statute.
Overall, given that legislators are not generally experts in all
fields of legislation, it is conceivable that legislative regulations
are intended to give specific guidance where Congress has
considered the matter and agreed that such guidance is
warranted. Conversely, interpretive regulations, under such a
paradigm, would serve as a catch-all-allowing agency experts to
fill legislative gaps that Congress failed to either anticipate or
address statutorily.
c. Significance of Court's Role in the Two-Step
Even though the Chevron decision seemingly grants
extraordinary interpretive powers to executive agencies, the
court's role in judicial review of agency rules and regulations is
far from insignificant. Indeed, step one of the Chevron two-step
analysis recognizes that the court, not the agency, determines if
Congress has directly addressed "the precise question at
issue."" Thus, the court, as the final authority on statutory
construction issues, must reject regulatory constructions that are
contrary to the clearly expressed intent of Congress. For
instance, if the Court in Chevron had determined initially that
Congress rejected the idea of a bubble concept for nonattainment
areas, the EPA's regulation adopting such a concept would have
been rejected hands down. Even if the Court and the agency
disagreed regarding Congress' intent on the issue, the agency's
evaluation of intent would have to give way to the Court's
independent determination.
Note, however, that the Court's independent determination at
step one does not, as has been suggested by other commentators,
mandate that the court ignore the agency's properly
standards.
164. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Further, the court states that "[tihe judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9.
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promulgated rule." Professor Coverdale recently argued for a
return to pre-Chevron traditional deference standards when
courts review legislative regulations, primarily because "[ilt is
not appropriate for the court to ignore the agency's views
altogether in its initial reading of the statute."'66 However, the
language of step one contains no requirement that the reviewing
court ignore the agency's views.6 7 Instead, step one only
speaks to who-the court or the agency-should decide what
Congress meant by its statutory language.'68  Placing any
limitation on the judiciary that denies courts the right to
consider any and all available information, including the
agency's views, is contrary to Chevron's call for "traditional"
methods of statutory construction at step one.'69 Thus, even at
step one, the court may (not must) rely on the agency's
interpretation to assist the court in determining what the
language of a statute means.'70
Step two of the Chevron analysis also leaves some room for
judicial fiat, albeit less than in step one. Step two requires that,
in the absence of clear congressional intent, an agency's
regulatory interpretation must be upheld if it is a permissible
165. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 5, at 54-55; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 301-02 (1988).
166. Coverdale, supra note 5, at 55.
167. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect."); see Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred
Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications Of The Supreme Court's Limited Resources
For Judicial Review Of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1125 (1987).
The traditional tools of statutory construction have long included reliance
(among other indications of meaning) on agency constructions given the
statute in other proceedings-as, for example, in litigation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Like the testimony of involved executive branch
officials at congressional hearings or the initial interpretations given a
statute by the responsible agency, an agency interpretation that has
remained consistent over the years can plausibly be regarded as evidence
of what is assumed to be a determinate congressional meaning, one to be
found out by the courts.
Strauss, supra at 1125 (footnotes omitted); see also Anthony, supra note 14, at 18-19
n.65.
170. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Lukhard v. Reed, 481
U.S. 368 (1987); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933).
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construction of the statute. 7' In Chevron, the Supreme Court
upheld the EPA's regulatory choice among competing and
conflicting policy goals as reasonable and quite permissible.'72
However, it is conceivable, though highly unlikely, that an
agency could issue a regulation that is in no way within the
realm of reason. In such an unlikely case, step two of Chevron
would require that the agency's rule be invalidated.
III. DEFINING DEFERENCE IN THE POST-CHEVRON ERA
A Introduction to the Post-Chevron Era
In the twelve years since Chevron, many commentators have
written about how the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have failed to adhere to Chevron.'73 However, in so
doing, few commentators have clearly defined what Chevron
deference actually means. By closely scrutinizing the cases
decided since Chevron, it is apparent that the issue of regulatory
deference is rarely ruled upon by the Supreme Court. 74 Recall
that Chevron involved a rule-challenge proceeding in which the
sole issue was whether the agency's "regulatory" interpretation
of the term "stationary source" was valid,'75 not whether the
agency applied the regulation in a proper manner.'76 Nor did
the court avoid the issue of the regulation's validity in Chevron
by ruling on some non-deference related issue.'77 Instead, the
high court in Chevron squarely decided the issue of the validity
of an agency's regulatory interpretive action.
A review of the reported Supreme Court cases decided after
Chevron involving Treasury regulations 78 reveals that only a
171. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
172. Id. at 842-43.
173. See generally Coverdale, supra note 5; Merrill, supra note 4. But see generally
Starr, supra note 147.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994).
175. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
176. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
177. See, e.g., Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473.
178. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995); United States v.
Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995); United States v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994);
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993); United States v.
McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546 (1993); United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992);
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 449
U.S. 554 (1991); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); Davis v. United States,
495 U.S. 472 (1990); Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. 244
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few resulted in a majority decision by the Court as to the validity
of a Treasury regulation.179 Instead, most of these cases either
did not involve an issue of deference to the Treasury's
regulatory interpretation of a tax statute;8 ' or, if Treasury
regulatory deference was an issue, the cases were consistent with
Chevron.8' This is contrary to the conclusions reached by other
commentators who looked at the effect of Chevron generally, not
just its effect on tax cases. 2 Additionally, this conclusion is at
odds with at least one other commentator who concludes that
federal courts have generally failed to abide by Chevron when
reviewing tax regulations." This part of the Article examines
some of these post-Chevron cases in an attempt to justify the
conclusion that Chevron deference is alive and well with respect
to Treasury regulations.
B. Cases in Which the Court Decided the Issue of Deference to the
Treasury's Regulation at Chevron's Step One
In the most recent post-Chevron case, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Schleier,"' the Supreme Court did not address the
validity of the Treasury's regulation regarding the exclusion of
damage recoveries from gross income. Instead, the Court decided
the substantive issue in the case at Chevron's step one (for
example, based on the plain meaning of the statute)." The
(1989); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989); K-mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281 (1988); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (1988); Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C., 479
U.S. 130 (1986); United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986);
United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986); United States
v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S.
241 (1985); Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
222 (1984).
179. See United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 242 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192 (1991); K-mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
180. See, e.g., K-mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
181. See, e.g., Irvine, 511 U.S. 242 (1994).
182. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4 (concluding that Chevron framework was used in
only one-half of cases in which the court considered the deference issue).
183. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 5, at 57-62.
184. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
185. Id. at 2167. In Schleier the taxpayer recovered back-pay and liquidated
damages pursuant to settlement of claims made under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Id. at 2161-62. The Service issued an income tax
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deference issue in Schleier was whether the Treasury's
regulatory interpretation of section 104(a)(2) required that the
damages be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income." 6 At
the time, Treasury Regulation section 1.104-1 provided:
Section 104(a)(2) [of the Internal Revenue Code] excludes
from gross income the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal
injuries or sickness. The term 'damages received (whether by
suit or agreement)' means an amount received (other than
workman's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit
or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution. 7
The taxpayer claimed that the plain language of this regulation
required that the damages be excluded from gross income
because ADEA damages are recovered for violation of "tort or tort
type rights."'
Without accepting, or rejecting, the taxpayer's contention that
ADEA damages were described by section 1.104-1(c), the Court
rejected the taxpayer's claim of exclusion based on the plain
language of section 104(a).'89 Indeed, the regulation and the
statute require that an amount excluded from gross income by
deficiency notice to the taxpayer based on the taxpayer's failure to pay income tax
on the liquidated damages portion of the ADEA settlement. Id. at 2162. Additionally,
the taxpayer filed a petition for refund of income taxes paid on the back-pay damages
portion of that same settlement. The United States Tax Court determined that both
the back-pay and liquidated damages amounts were excludable from the taxpayer's
gross income by § 104(a)(2) as "'damages received . . .on account of personal injuries
or sickness.'" Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affinmed. Id. at 2162-63. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court sided with the Treasury and reversed the Fifth Circuit,
concluding that the ADEA damages were not received "on account of personal
injuries" as required by § 104(a)(2). Id. at 2165, 2167.
186. Id. at 2165-66. Section 104(a)(2) provided:
Compensation for injuries or sickness (a) In general.-Except in the case
of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed
under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include ... (2) the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness.
Id. at 2163 n.3 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)).
187. Schleir, 115 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c), 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-
1(c) (1994)) (emphasis added).
188. Id- at 2165-66.
189. Id. at 2166-67.
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section 104(a)(2) be received both in a "tort or tort type action"
and "on account of personal injuries or sickness."9 ' Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens stated: "[tihe regulatory
requirement [for exclusion from gross income] that the amount be
received in a tort-type action is not a substitute for the statutory
requirement that the amount be received 'on account of personal
injuries or sickness'; it is an additional requirement." 9' Thus,
even accepting the taxpayer's claim that the ADEA damages
were covered by the regulation, those damages were not excluded
from gross income because they were not completely covered by
the statute. 92 That is, the ADEA damages were not "received
on account of personal injuries or sickness."'93
Notice that the Court's holding in Schleier is consistent with
Chevron's two-step approach to deference questions. Under
Chevron, the court must first establish what Congress meant
when it enacted the statute in order to determine whether
Congress addressed the precise issue. In Schleier, the Court did
just that when it established that the plain meaning of the
statutory exclusion is that the amount excluded must be received
"on account of personal injuries."" Thus, without regard to
whether an amount is or is not section 104(a)(2) "damages," the
amount is not excludable if received on account of a person's age
or on account of a person being fired.'95 According to the Court,
neither attaining a particular age nor being fired is a personal
injury or sickness.19
Notice also that the Court in Schleier referred to the
Treasury's "differing interpretations" of Treasury Regulation
section 1.104-1(c) as a basis for not according the Treasury's
position in the case any special deference. 97 One might argue
that this is an indication of the lack of deference the Court has
for the Treasury's regulatory interpretations. However, the
190. Id. at 2166.
191. Id.
192. Id,
193. Id. at 2165; see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
194. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
195. Id. at 2164.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2166 n.7 ("In view of the commissioner's differing interpretations of her
own regulation, we do not accord her present litigating position any special deference.
We do agree, however, that she reads the regulation correctly in this case."). But see
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (agency's reasonable interpretation of its
own regulations is entitled to deference).
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Court did not take issue with the Treasury's regulatory
interpretation of a statute. Instead, the Court merely raised a
concern about the Treasury interpreting that regulation
differently in different cases.' s Thus, the degree of judicial
deference to the Treasury's regulatory interpretations of
statutes, as opposed to its non-regulatory interpretations of its
own regulations, is unscathed.'99
198. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166 n.7.
199. Section 104(a)(2) was substantially changed after Schleier by Section 1605 of
the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, which provides:
1605. REPEAL OF EXCLUSION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND FOR
DAMAGES NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO PHYSICAL INJURIES OR
SICKNESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Paragraph (2) of section 104(a) (relating to
compensation for injuries or sickness) is amended to read as
follows:
"(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive
damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account
of personal physical injuries or physical sickness";
(b) EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS SUCH TREATED AS NOT
PHYSICAL INJURY OR PHYSICAL SICKNESS.-Section 104(a) is
amended by striking the last sentence and inserting the following
new sentence: "For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The
preceding sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in
excess of the amount paid for medical care (described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to
emotional distress."
(c) APPLICATION OF PRIOR LAW FOR STATES IN WHICH
ONLY PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS.-Section 104 is amended by
redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and by inserting after
subsection (b) the following new subsection:
"(c) APPLICATION OF PRIOR LAW IN CERTAIN
CASES.-The phrase '(other than punitive damages)' shall not
apply to punitive damages awarded in a civil action-
(1) which is a wrongful death action, and
(2) with respect to which applicable State law (as in
effect on September 13, 1995 and without regard to any
modification after such date) provides, or has been construed
to provide by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a
decision issued on or before September 13, 1995, that only
punitive damages may be awarded in such an action.
This subsection shall cease to apply to any civil action filed
on or after the first date on which the applicable State law
ceases to provide (or is no longer construed to provide) the
treatment described in paragraph (2)."
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.-
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The major issue in United States v. Williams.. was whether
a person who, under protest, paid tax for another person to
remove a tax lien from her property was a "taxpayer" entitled to
sue for refund under § 6511(a) of Title 26.201 As in Schleier, the
Court made its ruling based on the plain meaning of the statute,
§ 7701 of Title 26, which defines "taxpayer," concluding that the
payer was a taxpayer. 0 2 Accordingly, she was entitled to
exhaust administrative remedies and file a refund action
pursuant to section 1346(a).0 3 The Court refused to defer to the
Treasury's litigation position in Williams and, instead, held that
the payer was a section 6511(a) "taxpayer" even though she was
not assessed a tax.2 4
One might argue that Williams is a case in which the Chevron
logic fails because the court refused to defer to the Treasury's
interpretation of the statutory term "taxpayer." However, this
argument is erroneous for two reasons. First, because the Court
in Williams decided that case based on the plain meaning of
section 1346(a) (that is, that Congress addressed the precise
issue in the statute), the Williams decision is consistent with step
one of Chevron. Second, and more importantly, this Article's
thesis is that Chevron deference only applies when the agency's
interpretation is made by way of a regulation.2 0 ' Therefore, a
Treasury attorney's in-court (non-regulatory) interpretation of a
statute does not have the same force and effect as a regulatory
interpretation that speaks to the precise issue.
(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the amendments made by this section shall apply to amounts
received after the date of the enactment of this Act, in
taxable years ending after such date.
(2) EXCEPTION.-The amendments made by this section
shall not apply to any amount received under a written
binding agreement, court decree, or mediation award in effect
on (or issued on or before) September 13, 1995.
Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
200. United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995).
201. Id. at 1615-17.
202. Id. at 1617.
203. Id. at 1618-19.
204. Id.
205. Although the Treasury did have a regulation that defined the term "taxpayer"
for purposes of § 6511(a), that definition was merely a statute-tracking definition.
That is, the Treasury's regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-16 (1994), merely repeated
(in substance) the statute's definition of "taxpayer" contained in § 7701.
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C. Cases Involving Application of, Not Deference To, the
Treasury's Regulation
United States v. Irvine25 and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States,0 7 involved the application of, not deference to,
Treasury regulations. In Irvine, the issue was whether a
disclaimer was valid to prevent a taxpayer from being subject to
gift tax liability.2 18  Under the applicable state law, the
disclaimer was effective because it was made within six months
of the event identifying the disclaimant and causing her interest
to become fixed °.2 ' Accordingly, the taxpayer treated the
disclaimer as effective for federal gift tax purposes and did not
pay gift tax associated with the disclaimed amounts.210 The
Service, pursuant to an audit, determined that the taxpayer
indirectly transferred the disclaimed property by gift to her
children.21' Therefore, pursuant to the gift tax statute,212 the
taxpayer owed gift tax on the transfer."3 Further, according to
the Service's reading of the Treasury's disclaimer
regulation,2 14  the taxpayer's attempt to disclaim was not
206. 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994).
207. 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
208. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. at 1475. In Irvine, the taxpayer's grandparents created an
irrevocable trust in 1917, naming the taxpayer as one of the persons to receive the
corpus of the trust upon termination. The taxpayer became aware of her interest in
the trust in 1931-when she reached age 21. In 1979, nearly two months after
termination of the trust but prior to distribution of the remainder interest, the
taxpayer disclaimed her interest in the trust, as a result of which her share of the
corpus passed to her children. Id.
209. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 501.211, subd. 3 (1978), repealed by 1989 Minn.
Laws, ch. 340, art. 1, § 77 and replaced by MINN. STAT. § 501B.86, subd. 3 (1992)
(changing the time permitted for disclaiming to nine months, effective January 1,
1990).
210. Id. at 1475.
211. Id.
212. The gift tax is imposed by § 2501(a)(1), which reads in part: "[a] tax . . . is
hereby imposed for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such
calendar year by any individual, resident or nonresident." 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1)
(1994). Pursuant to § 2511(a), the gift tax applies to direct as well as indirect
transfers of property by gift: "[slubject to the limitations contained in this chapter,
the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or
personal, tangible or intangible." Id. § 2511(a).
213. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. at 1475-76.
214. In 1959, Treasury regulation § 25.2511-1(c) provided that:
The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions
whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed
or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed,
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effective to avoid gift tax liability.2 15 The regulation required
that a disclaimer be made within a reasonable time after a
taxpayer learns of the creation of the interest, which the Irvine
taxpayer failed to do.21
constitute gifts subject to tax. See further § 25.2512-8. Where law
governing the administration of the decedent's estate gives a beneficiary,
heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to
accept ownership of property transferred from a decedent (whether the
transfer is effected by the decedent's will or by the law of descent and
distribution of intestate property), a refusal to accept ownership does not
constitute the making of a gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable
time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer. The refusal must
be unequivocable [sic] and effective under the local law. There can be no
refusal of ownership of property after its acceptance. Where the local law
does not permit such a refusal, any disposition by the beneficiary, heir,
or next-of-kin whereby ownership is transferred gratuitously to another
constitutes the making of a gift by the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin. In
any case where a refusal is purported to relate to only a part of the
property, the determination of whether or not there has been a complete
and unqualified refusal to accept ownership will depend on all of the
facts and circumstances in each particular case, taking into account the
recognition and effectiveness of such a purported refusal under the local
law. In the absence of facts to the contrary, if a person fails to refuse to
accept a transfer to him of ownership of a decedents property within a
reasonable time after learning of the existence of the transfer, he will be
presumed to have accepted the property.
Id. at 1476 n.4 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c), 26 C.F.R. § 25.2511-1(c) (1959)).
215. Id. at 1475, 1483.
216. Id. at 1479-80. After the audit, the taxpayer paid the associated gift tax and
interest assessment and immediately sought a refund. Id. at 1476. After the Service
denied the taxpayer's refund request, the taxpayer's estate filed a refund action in
federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the estate
concluding that imposing gift tax on the disclaimer would be tantamount to
retroactive application of the gift tax statute. Id. at 1477. The applicable gift tax
statute referred to by the district court, contained in the Revenue Act of 1932, was
not enacted until 1932, well after the creation of the taxpayer's remainder interest
in the trust in 1917. The Eighth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed the
district court. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. at 1477.
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit read the Treasury's disclaimer
regulation (referring to a "taxable transfer") literally. Accordingly, in the court's view,
the interest created by the pre-1932 transfer could not have been disclaimed under
the regulation because it was not taxable and, thus, could never be a 'taxable
transfer." Id. at 1477-78. Therefore, both lower courts looked to state law to
determine that the taxpayer's disclaimer was effective. Id.
Pursuant to joint agreement of the parties, the court noted that the then-current
(1986) version of the regulation superseded the earlier 1959 version. Id. at 1476 n.6.
Section 7805(b) permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to 'prescribe the extent, if
any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be
applied without retroactive effect." Id.; see also Automobile Club of Mich. v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). Thus, the relevant regulation applicable to the
case was § 25.2511-1(c)(2) (1993), which provided in relevant part:
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The Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the
lower courts to look to state law.217 Indeed, the general rule in a
disclaimer case was that the disclaimer was taxable unless the
Treasury's regulatory exception applied.21 Accordingly, absent
the regulation's applicability, the general federal (not state) law
of disclaimers governed." 9 Thus, because either applicability or
non-applicability of the disclaimer would result in gift tax
liability, the high court refused to rule on the issue of whether
the Treasury's regulation applied.22' Notably, the issue of
whether the regulation was valid never arose, except in the
context of whether the regulation resulted in taxation of a
transaction that pre-dated enactment of the gift tax.
22'
However, the Court quickly dismissed this argument by pointing
out that the critical transaction (the disclaimer) occurred in 1979,
well after enactment of the gift tax in 1932.222
- In the case of taxable transfers creating an interest in the person
disclaiming made before January 1, 1977, where the law governing the
administration of the decedents estate gives a beneficiary, heir, or next-
of-kin a right completely and unqualifiedly to refuse to accept ownership
of property transferred from a decedent (whether the transfer is effected
by the decedents will or by the law of descent and distribution), a
refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a gift if
the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
existence of the transfer. The refusal must be unequivocal and effective
under the local law. There can be no refusal of ownership of property
after its acceptance. In the absence of the facts to the contrary, if a
person fails to refuse to accept the transfer to him of ownership of a
decedent's property within a reasonable time after learning of the
existence of the transfer, he will be presumed to have accepted the
property. Where the local law does not permit such a refusal, any
disposition by the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin whereby ownership is
transferred gratuitously to another constitutes the making of a gift by
the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin. In any case where a refusal is
purported to relate to only a part of the property, the determination of
whether or not there has been a complete and unqualified refusal to
accept ownership will depend on all the facts and circumstances in each
particular case, taking into account the recognition and effectiveness of
such a purported refusal under the local law.
Id. at 1477 n.6 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(2), 26 C.F.R. § 25.2511-1(c)(2)
(1993)).
217. Id. at 1481.
218. Id at 1482.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1480.
221. Id. at 1481-82.
222. Id. at 1482.
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In Newark,223 the Supreme Court once again faced an issue of
applicability, not validity, of a Treasury regulation. The issue in
Newark concerned the depreciability of an intangible asset
consisting of a customer base that was also goodwill.2 The
Court held that an intangible asset is depreciable where the
taxpayer/owner proves that the asset has a reasonably
determinable useful life.2" The Court never addressed the issue
of the validity of the Treasury's depreciation regulation-only
whether the taxpayer proved its case that the questioned asset
had a reasonably determinable useful life. 6
In 1987, the Newark Morning Ledger newspaper sought a
refund of income tax paid by its predecessor-in-interest, The
Herald Company.27 Herald paid the tax as a result of the
Service's disallowance of a depreciation deduction Herald took,
pursuant to section 167(a), on an intangible asset acquired by
purchase in 1976.2" The asset consisted of "paid subscribers" to
a newspaper organization that Herald intended to merge with
the following year.2' The Service disallowed depreciation of the
"paid subscribers" asset on the grounds that the asset was
nondepreciable goodwill within the meaning of the Treasury's
depreciation regulation section 1.167(a)-3.23 ° Pursuant to that
regulation, if an intangible asset is shown to have a limited
useful life based on known experience or other factors and the
223. 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
224. Id. at 548.
225. Id. at 566.
226. Id. at 570.
227. Id. at 550-51.
228. Id. at 548-50. Section 167(a) provides: "General Rule.-There shall be allowed
as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-(1) of property used in the trade
or business, or (2) of property held for the production of income." Id. at 548 n.1
(quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.167(a)-3 (1992)).
229. Id. at 550.
230. Id Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-(3) provides:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of
use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited
period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy,
such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.
Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible asset, the useful life
of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation.
No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.
Id at 548 n.1 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, 26 C.F.R. § 1.167(a)-3 (1992)).
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length of that life can be reasonably estimated, the asset may be
depreciable.23' Further, if the asset consists of goodwill it will
not be depreciable.232
In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of the fact that its decision was based on a
factual determination, not whether the Treasury's depreciation
regulation was valid. 33 Indeed, had the Service presented a
credible case to support its litigation position, the Court might
have ruled differently. However, because the Treasury
interpreted its own regulation as permitting depreciation of
goodwill in an "unusual case" and because the Court saw this as
an unusual case, the court's ruling was consistent with the
Treasury's regulation.2" Thus, once again, the Chevron policy
is not thwarted.
D. Determining Reasonableness Under Chevron's Step Two
Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner,2 35 is another example
of how the Supreme Court has abided by the Chevron two-step
deference philosophy. In fact, Cottage Savings demonstrates how
the Court determines, at Chevron's step two, whether an
agency's regulatory interpretation is reasonable.
The issue in Cottage Savings was whether a taxpayer's loss
realized from an exchange of properties could be recognized in
the year of the exchange." The Supreme Court concluded that
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 566. The taxpayer sued the Service in federal district court arguing that
the intangible "paid subscriber" asset was depreciable. Id. at 550-51. At trial, the
taxpayer presented expert testimony that the asset had a determinable useful life
based on known experience and presented evidence of reasonable estimates of the
length of that life. Id. at 551. The Service did not contest the taxpayer's expert
testimony or evidence. Instead, the Service argued that the "paid subscriber" asset is
indistinguishable from goodwill and, accordingly, is not depreciable. Id. at 551-52.
After trial, the district court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, noting that the taxpayer
successfully showed that the "paid subscriber" asset was separate and distinct from
goodwill. Id. at 552. The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court on this point
and reversed, noting that goodwill and "paid subscribers" are indistinguishable. Id.
234. Id. at 559.
235. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
236. Id. at 557-58. In Cottage Savings the taxpayer, a savings association,
transferred participation interests in 252 mortgages to other savings associations in
exchange for participation in 305 other mortgages. Id. at 557. The face value of the
participation interests exchanged by the taxpayer was less than the market value of
the participation interests received. The taxpayer deducted the difference as a loss on
426
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the loss deduction was permissible under section 1001(a) 7 and
allowed by section 165(a).238  The Court noted that the
taxpayer's loss could only be realized, and thus deductible, if
resulting from a section 1001(a) "disposition of property"
transaction."9 Accordingly, as a "disposition of property"
transaction, as long as the adjusted basis' exceeds the amount
realized,24' section 1001(a) permits realization of the loss.
Unless otherwise provided, the realized loss is also recognized
and, presumably, deductible.'
The Court then addressed the deference issue: whether the
Treasury's regulatory interpretation of the phrase "disposition of
property" as used in section 1001 was reasonable, and thus,
valid.' The Treasury's regulation provided that "'the gain or
loss realized... from the exchange of property for other property
differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as
income or as loss sustained.' "244 The Commissioner argued
that, pursuant to the regulation, the taxpayer's property
disposition does not qualify for section 1001 realization unless
its 1980 federal income tax return. Id. at 558. The Commissioner disallowed the loss,
but the Tax Court later held that the loss was permissible because the taxpayer had
"realized" the loss within the meaning of § 1001(a) of Title 26. Id. at 558-59. The
Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court. Id. at 558. While the Circuit Court agreed
with the Tax Court that the taxpayer realized the loss, it concluded that the loss was
not allowable because it was not "actually" sustained in 1980 as required by § 165(a)
of Title 26. Id.
237. Id. at 566. Section 1001(a) provides:
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the
excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided
in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of
the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the
amount realized.
26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
238. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 568. Section 165(a) provided a deduction for " 'any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.' " Id. at 567 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 165(a)).
239. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 559.
240. The "adjusted basis" for determining gain or loss from the sale or other
disposition of property is "the basis .. . , adjusted as provided in section 1016". See
26 U.S.C. § 1011(a) (1994). The "basis" of property is generally "the cost of such
property, except as otherwise provided. . ." See id. § 1012.
241. Id. The "amount realized" from the sale or other disposition of property is "the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received." See id. § 1001(b).
242. See id. § 1001(c).
243. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560-61.
244. Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1, 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001-1 (1990) (emphasis
omitted)).
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the properties exchanged are "materially different."245 Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, noted that "[n]either the
language nor the history of [section 1001] indicates whether and
to what extent property exchanged must differ .... 
246
Therefore, the only issue for the Court in deciding whether to
defer to the Treasury's regulatory interpretation of section 1001
was whether that interpretation was reasonable.247
The Cottage Savings Court held that the Treasury's
regulation was reasonable for two reasons. First, the regulation
represented a long-lasting interpretation of section 1001.248 The
Court noted that the original language contained in section 1001
was first placed in the Code in 1924249 and that the Treasury's
interpretation has consistently required materially different
properties since 1934.250 Second, the Treasury's interpretation
was consistent with Supreme Court precedent from the 1920's
indicating that the properties exchanged must be "materially" or
"essentially" different."'
At first blush, these two bases for determining the
reasonableness of the regulation appear to be a reversion to the
pre-Chevron era when courts looked at various factors to
establish a regulation's validity. 2 However, recall that the
Chevron Court never disavowed the pre-Chevron factors. Instead,
245. Id. at 560.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 560-61.
248. Id. at 561.
249. Id. at 561; see The Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, § 202(a).
250. Treas. Reg. 86, Article 111-1, promulgated pursuant to the Revenue Act of
1934, provided: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the Act regards as income or as loss
sustained, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from
the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in
extent." Id. at 560 n.6 (quoting Treas. Reg. 86, art. 111-1 (emphasis omitted)).
251. Id. at 562. The court cited the following cases: United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156, 173 (1921); Weiss v. Stern, 265 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1924); and Marr v.
United States, 268 U.S. 536, 540-42 (1925). Id.
252. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 5, at 59.
In Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, the Commissioner requested
Chevron deference for a general authority regulation. The Court neither
applied Chevron nor held that it was inapplicable, but simply ignored the
request. Instead, it cited a classic tax deference case, National Muffler
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, for the proposition that courts must defer
to general authority regulations because Congress has entrusted the
administration of the tax laws to the Commissioner. The Court also
invoked the doctrine that long-standing regulations merit special
deference when Congress has reenacted the underlying statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the Chevron Court merely adjusted the manner in which
reviewing courts use those factors. Consistent with that
adjustment, the Court in Chevron merely concluded that, absent
contrary congressional direction, an administrative interpretation
of a statute will be upheld if permissible and reasonableY
Thus, reference to long-standing interpretations that appear
acceptable to Congress and reliance on historical court precedents
are legitimate means of establishing the reasonableness of an
interpretation.
Notably, the Court in Cottage Savings did not defer to the
Treasury's non-regulatory interpretation of what constitutes a
material difference for purposes of section 1001(a).' Instead,
the Court looked to other authorities (for example, court
precedent) to establish what "material difference" requires. 5
This is consistent with this Article's contention that Chevron
deference only applies to regulatory interpretations of
congressional enactments. Thus, as in Cottage Savings, an
agency's "in-court" or other nonregulatory interpretations are
not entitled to Chevron-type deference. As such, a court faced
with nonregulatory interpretations is free to disregard those
interpretations without going through the Chevron two-step.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with the notion that Chevron signaled a
major occurrence in administrative law jurisprudence. Indeed it
has. Chevron demonstrates that courts and agencies can co-exist
in an ever-changing and growing democratic world. The need for
agencies as interpreters of the law is not obviated by the role of
courts as judicial arbiters. As indicated by both pre-Chevron and
post-Chevron decisions, courts will always have the final say
when it comes to areas of general legal knowledge, not
necessarily requiring any nonlegal experiential insights.
However, in cases when the experience of an administering
agency is helpful, the Chevron framework permits peaceful co-
existence by permitting the agency's views to guide the way.
253. Chevron, U.S.AL, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843, 865 (1984).
254. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 562.
255. Id. at 562-67.
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While this Article may have begun with visions of fondness
with respect to Chevron, it is all too apparent that those visions
are somewhat blurred by the noticeable absence of references to
Chevron by the Supreme Court. Perhaps the high court
recognizes that Chevron signaled something special, but wants to
emphasize that much of what lead up to Chevron is alive and
well? or perhaps the high court has other reasons for failing to at
least note in reference that Chevron does or does not apply in
certain situations? Nevertheless, the Court's allegiance to
Chevron-when relevant-is clear.
With respect to Treasury regulations, Chevron merely
sharpens the notions that existed prior to 1984. Tax regulations
that interpret terms not already defined by statute or legislative
history will likely be upheld against a claim of invalidity. On the
other hand, tax regulations that interpret terms that have
already been defined by Congress are less likely to survive
judicial scrutiny and will likely be invalidated if challenged.
Thus, as was the case before Chevron, the absence, or presence,
of a congressional interpretation of a statutory term that an
agency interprets and defines by regulation is critical to deciding
if the regulation is a valid exercise of rule-making power. The
Court determines in the first instance if the definition is present.
If not present, the Treasury is free to impose its reasonable "tax"
will. However, the Court decides in the second instance if that
will is reasonable.
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